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Abstract The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective.
But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the
form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we
undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this
relationship.
Keywords Justification  Gradability  Degrees of justification  Degrees 
Credence  Scale  Scalar  Justified  Gradable adjectives  Epistemic justification
1 Introduction
The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the
relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x
is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake
to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship.
2 Evidence for gradability
Linguists use a variety of superficial tests for whether an adjective is gradable.
‘Justified’ passes these tests with flying colours.
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Test 1. Admissibility of comparative constructions (e.g. ‘x is flatter than y’, ‘x is
more regrettable than y’, ‘x is as regrettable as y’ etc.).
Comparative uses of ‘justified’ are not hard to find. (Note that as most of the uses of
‘justified’ in English concern actions we shall freely make use of data from such uses):
(1) But the film’s real triumph lies in the fact that the rage effects wear off,
meaning bashing your friend’s brains in isn’t quite as justified as it usually is
in zombie movies—at least not at first.1
(2) Over goes Rakitic and the red card that follows is as justified as the challenge
was futile and brainless.2
(3) Prosecutors and judges, for years, have meted out punishment based on a view
about how people work and how the world works that is as justified as an
argument that a doctor shouldn’t wash his hands before handling a patient.3
Test 2. Felicity of ‘how F’ questions (e.g. ‘How tall is she?’, ‘How flat is it?’).
Questions of the form ‘How justified is/was x’ are similarly not hard to find:
(4) But how justified were fan fears that Leeds would be starting the new season
with a new man in the dugout for the eighth year in a row?4
(5) How Justified Is Modi’s New Title?5
Test 3: Admissibility of degree modifiers (e.g. ‘x isn’t flat at all’, ‘x is extremely
regrettable’, ‘x is slightly wet’, ‘x is somewhat bent’, ‘y is completely confident’).
Many degree modifiers are completely felicitous for ‘justified’:
(6) Defence analyst David Perry of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute said
those concerns are completely justified given the Trump administration’s
penchant for using whatever means necessary to get foreign countries to buy
U.S. products.6
(7) He also said the government would ‘‘ride shotgun’’ to ensure the €480 m
contingency fund is not drawn on unless absolutely justified.7
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Of course, not all degree modifiers are felicitously combined with ‘justified’. For
example, ‘x is slightly justified’ and ‘x is very justified’ and ‘x is almost justified’
are pretty marginal to our ear. But it is common even for paradigmatic gradable
adjectives to be somewhat choosy about which degree modifiers they admit.9 Of
course one would ultimately like to know whether there are deep reasons for the
infelicity of certain combinations. We will not get to the bottom of that issue here.
3 Tallness and justification
For many gradable adjectives, it is very natural to model them in the following way:
They are associated with a certain scale and in context, a threshold on the scale is
imposed.10 This model is, for example, extremely natural for ‘tall’: In context, ‘tall’ is
associated with a threshold on the scale of heights. Adjectives for which such a model
is appropriate are what Peter Unger and Chris Kennedy (following Unger) call
‘relative gradable adjectives’. It is clear enough that epistemologists who have
discussed the relationship between justification and degrees of justification have been
conceiving of justification on the model of a relative gradable adjective. Sometimes
the imagined threshold is that of coherence, sometimes that of evidential support.11
But we do not wish to dwell on such choice points right now. For now, we merely
wish to draw attention to a key commonality—that the models in play have a structure
akin to those that are typically deployed for relative gradable adjectives. Something
like the threshold model is in play in (or is the topic of) the following remarks:
(9) A belief system is justified if it is coherent to a sufficiently high degree.
This, in essence, is Laurence BonJour’s 1985 solution to the regress
problem. (Olsson 2017)
(10) For any reasonable standard of justification or knowledge, there will be a
point at which I just meet, and do not exceed, that standard, and (again
assuming I am justified in believing her to be the better arithmetician) I will
then not know or be justified in believing the proposition that if she says the
sum is wrong, then she is wrong. (Audi 2010: 196).
(11) Compare Peter Klein’s argument (1995, 219). This argument assumes, of
course, that degree of justification should be understood as likelihood of
9 For instance: while ‘very tall’, ‘completely pure’, ‘slightly wet’ are all felicitous, ‘very pure’,
‘completely tall’, and ‘slightly small’ appear to be infelicitous.
10 Note that we do not say ‘semantically associated’. As we shall explain in the final section, it is not true
in general that scalar uses are explained by semantic association with a scale.
11 In this paper we are largely operating with the kind of framework introduced by Chris Kennedy and
which has been most dominant in work by philosophers of language on gradable adjectives (see, for
example, Kennedy 1999, 2007; Kennedy and McNally 2005). However, the degree-theoretic framework
for handling gradable adjectives has not been beyond criticism in the semantics literature. See, notably,
recent work by Wellwood—e.g. Cariani et al. (ms) and Wellwood (2015). It is a good question to what
extent the ideas in this paper can happily be adapted to Wellwood’s alternative framework. It is beyond




truth, and that there is a threshold level of justification required for a belief
to be considered ‘justified’. (Huemer 2001: 396, n18)
But there are important differences between ‘tall’ and ‘justified’ that should not
be ignored. In particular, ‘justified’ has hallmarks of what Unger and Kennedy call
‘absolute gradable adjectives’, ones which are more naturally associated with
endpoints on a scale than thresholds on a scale. In this connection, it bears emphasis
that one of the standard tests for absolute gradable adjectives is susceptibility to
modifiers like ‘completely’. It is unacceptable to combine such modifiers with
‘tall’—‘John is completely tall’ is utterly infelicitous. However, the expression
‘completely justified’ is altogether natural. Here is a second test from Kennedy: The
negation of relative gradable adjectives does not imply their antonyms, while the
negative of absolute gradable adjectives does. (‘Not tall’ does not imply ‘short’
while ‘Not pure’ does imply ‘impure’.) It is natural to think of ‘unjustified’ as the
antonym of ‘justified’, in which case, this test places ‘justified’ on the absolute side.
Some further data, while admittedly less straightforward tends towards the
categorization of ‘justified’ in the absolute category: ‘X is F, but Y is more F/Fer’
sounds considerablymoremarginal for absolutes than for relatives. Thuswhile ‘X is tall
butY is taller’ is a verynatural everydayuse of tall, ‘x is flat but y is flatter’ is a littlemore
awkward sounding. (We don’t want to go so far as to say it is uninterpretable or totally
bizarre, merely that it sounds like a slightly more marginal or creative use of language.)
Andwe can report that ordinary informants tended to classify ‘x is justified and y ismore
justified’ as towards the marginal end. (The tendencies of philosophers were more
haphazard. Certain epistemologists we asked were sufficiently imbued with a theory of
how justification works as to find ‘x is justified and y is more justified’ to be completely
straightforward.) For absolutes, the construction ‘x is F but is not completely F’ tends to
bemarginal. In linewith this, ‘Her suspicion/view/belief that the stockmarketwill crash
is justified but not completely justified’ seems pretty marginal.
Kennedy (1999) notes that within the category of absolutes there are two
subcategories: Maximal absolutes are associated with the maximal degree of a scale.
Meanwhile minimals are associated with the property of having any positive degree
whatsoever along a scale. ‘Flat’ is a maximal—it tends to be associated with being
maximally flat, while open is minimal—any degree of openness counts as being
open. ‘Justified’ patterns more like a maximal. For example, minimals but not
maximals combine felicitously with ‘slightly’. But ‘slightly justified’ is extremely
awkward. (Alvin Goldman includes ‘slightly justified’ on his list of graded uses of
‘justified’, but that does not at all comport with the habits of English speakers12).
Similarly, for maximal gradables, ‘x is F but could have been more F’ is pretty
marginal (Kennedy notes for example that ‘X is straight but could have been made
straighter’ is a bit odd). In line with this, an ‘The stockbroker was justified in
12 See, Goldman: ‘‘Support for reliabilism is bolstered by reflecting on degrees of justifiedness. Talk of
justifiedness commonly distinguishes different grades of justifiedness: ‘fully’ justified, ‘somewhat’
justified, ‘slightly’ justified, and the like.[..] These distinctions appear to be neatly correlated with degrees
of reliability of belief-forming processes.’’ (Goldman 1986: 104).
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thinking that the stock market would crash but could have been more justified’ is
also pretty marginal.13
We submit that the absolute features of ‘justified’ should at least give one pause
when it comes to the threshold model.
4 Justification and probability
As an instructive case study, it is useful to see how problematic it is to try to model
the behavior of ‘justified’ using a probability scale. The idea that degrees of
justification are somehow a matter of epistemic probability is certainly a common
idea in the literature:
(12) To express the common view a little more precisely, the degree of
justification for accepting the proposition h given the evidence e (based on
the background assumption b—this is suppressed in the following discus-
sion) is the conditional probability of h given e, or P(h|e). (Shogenji 2012:
30).
See also Huemer on Klein above (cf. (11)).
The basic idea of such models is that one will have more justification to believe P
than Q just in case P is more probable than Q. This model can be developed in a way
that models ‘justified’ on ‘tall’ so that ‘x has justification to believe Q’/‘is justified
in believing Q’ just in case P surpasses a probabilistic threshold set by context. But
one might also be motivated by the considerations in the previous section to instead
develop the model in such a way that ‘justified’ gets associated with an endpoint on
the probabilistic scale, so that, strictly speaking ‘x is justified in believing p’
requires maximal probability.
But whichever way one goes, there are reasons to doubt that such a model is
appropriate. One thing to realize of course is that this model can at best be a model
of how propositional justification for belief works. The literature distinguishes
doxastic justification from propositional justification—one can have great evidence
for P but one’s belief be in poor standing—and hence doxastically unjustified—
because one’s belief is not based on one’s good evidence but on a bad argument
instead. And even more obviously this model is not well suited to explaining
degrees of justification for fear, concern, suspicion, suspending judgment and so on.
Additional justification for suspending judgment is not tantamount to additional
epistemic probability. (Distinguishing ‘epistemic’ from ‘non-epistemic’ uses of
‘justified’ will not sidestep the issue: degree of justification for suspending judgment
seems to be an epistemic issue.)
But even focusing just on the case of justification to believe, there is good reason
for doubting that degrees of justification correspond to degrees of likelihood.
13 Kennedy also seems to think that when a gradable adjective ‘is F’ is associated with a scale that has a
closed upper bound, the gradable adjective will tend to be a maximal absolute. As Daniel Lassiter has
noted this is dubious. The expression ‘is likely’ is not absolute but plausibly it is associated with a
probability scale with a closed upper bound, see Lassiter (2017: 82ff).
Graded epistemic justification
123
First, note that it is perfectly felicitous to say that an action or belief or emotion is
not justified at all. And a natural hypothesis is that ‘not justified at all’ signifies zero
degree of justification. If degrees of justification corresponded to epistemic
probabilities, the natural hypothesis would be that belief in a certain proposition P is
not justified at all just in case its epistemic probability is zero. But that hypothesis is
not borne out. One is not justified at all in believing that coin will come up heads—
but the epistemic probability of that outcome is intermediate, not zero. This
consideration is not decisive however: for example, perhaps being justified at all
requires surpassing a threshold on the probability scale (we shall return to ‘at all’
presently).
But note second, and more decisively, that ‘justified’ does not felicitously
combine with numerical (e.g. ratio and proportional modifiers) modifiers like ‘twice
as’, ‘ten percent’ and so on.14 If justification was linked to a scale like probability
that is friendly to numerical modifiers, then one would expect much more felicity
than we do in fact see.
A comparison with ‘being confident’ is somewhat illuminating here. ‘Confident’
has notable similarities and differences with ‘justified’. Like justified it seems to
pattern like an absolute gradable: ‘Completely confident’ is felicitous, ‘confident but
not completely confident’ is marginal, and so on.
Moreover, there are analogous points to be made as regards ‘not being justified at
all’ and ‘not being confident at all’. Just as we can say a belief that a die will come
up 3 is not justified at all, it is similarly natural to say that one is not confident at all
that the die will come up three. But in this case, one’s credence is far from zero.
(This point is noted by Williamson, mn.) Thus, the flatfooted idea that one is not
confident at all is tantamount to zero credence is wrongheaded.
But in another respect the behavior of ‘confident’ is quite different to ‘justified’.
And this is because, even outside the philosophy room, numerical constructions
combine felicitously with ‘confident’. Thus, it is not at all unnatural to say that ‘I am
three times more confident that the coin will come up heads than that the die will
come up three’ and ‘I am fifty per cent confident that the coin will come up heads’.15
This creates a prima facie puzzle. How can it be that one can truly say ‘I have no
confidence/I am not confident at all that she will win the bet’ while also finding it
natural to say ‘I am three times more confident that she will win the bet than that the
die will come up three’?
A few solutions suggest themselves. One view is that two quite different scales
are in play in the context of each of the speeches which have little to do with each
14 The data from usage is quite dramatic here. A google search revealed 6 and 1390 hits respectively for
‘fifty percent justified’, as contrasted with ‘fifty per cent confident’, and 0 and 1320 hits respectively for
‘ninety percent justified’ and ‘ninety per cent confident’. Meanwhile, ‘twice as justified’ and ‘twice as
confident’ got 6 and 61,300 hits respectively.
15 As a referee noted, this contrast between ‘confident’ and ‘justified’ may have its roots in the fact that
‘justified’ has a deontic use whereas ‘confident’ does not. When we say that a coach was justified in using
a formation, we seem to be somehow conveying the faultlessness or permissibility of the act. The fact that
the concepts of faultlessness and permissibility do not play at all well with ratio modifiers may thus be
intimately connected to relevant behavior of ‘justified’. For more on the normative import of ‘justified’,
see Beddor (2017).
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other. According to an alternative and arguably more plausible view, there is a
single scale, where ‘being confident at all’ marks not an endpoint on the scale but a
threshold. A natural first pass take on ‘being confident at all’ is along the lines of
‘being at all close to complete confidence’. (In a sense this introduces a second
scale—degrees of closeness to the max—but it is highly parasitic on the original
probability scale.)
It is worth noting in passing that similar ‘at all’ data arises for other gradable
absolutes. Thus ‘not being flat at all’ and ‘not being dry at all’ do not plausibly
equate to being maximally bumpy and wet. In those cases, a threshold approach
naturally suggests itself and it is natural to extend the threshold approach to
‘confident’.
In short, the numericals make it much more natural to associate ‘confident’ with
something that has the structure of a probability scale that it is for ‘justified’. For
confident, there is a reasonable prima facie case that ‘at all’ marks a threshold on the
scale corresponding to something like ‘at all close to the max’.
Many philosophers will think something has obviously gone wrong. On the
picture presented ‘confident’ and ‘completely confident’ is associated with the
maximal end of the credal scale so that ‘completely confident’ is equivalent to
subjective certainty. They will complain that it is obvious that one can be
completely confident in the ordinary sense without being certain (and even more
obvious that ‘confident’ in the ordinary sense does not equate to certainty). But this
is too quick. First, it is worth noting that in many languages ‘confident’ and ‘certain’
get translated the same. Thus, in Latvian both ‘X is confident that p’ and ‘X is
certain that p’ are naturally translated as ‘X ir pārliecināts, ka p’ (similarly, in
Russian both ‘confident’ and ‘certain’ can be translated by ‘ydepey’). Second, note
that analogous issues arise for other gradable adjectives. A philosopher contrives a
demanding sense of being empty of beer and then notes that in the ordinary sense
‘being completely empty’ can be truly ascribed to a beer glass in a pub even though
the glass is not empty in the demanding sense. There are well known ways to
approach this. One might say that the pub ascription is not strictly speaking true but
nevertheless felicitously assertable and explain why. Or one might introduce a kind
of contextualism according to which various scales are in play in contexts and that
certain tiny quantities of beer don’t register on the scale in play at certain contexts
(cf. Greco 2015).
But third we should note an extra complication. As Chris Kennedy notes, once
we have a scale with a maximum and a minimum, adjectives often exhibit a degree
of flexibility as to whether they gravitate toward a reading that means something
like ‘maximum’ or instead to something like ‘not minimum’. He illustrates this for
‘opaque’ and ‘transparent’:
(13) The antonyms opaque and transparent verify this prediction. According to
the diagnostics discussed above, these use a totally closed scale (completely/
slightly opaque/transparent), and so are in principle compatible with either
minimum or maximum standard interpretations in the positive form. The
following examples show that both interpretations are in principle possible.
Consider a context in which I am manipulating a device that changes the
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degree of tint of a car window from 0% (completely transparent) to 100%
(completely opaque). (67a) can be felicitously utterered at the point at which
I have almost reached 100% of tint, demonstrating both that opaque can
have a maximum standard (I am denying that the glass is completely
opaque) and that transparent can have a minimum standard (partial
transparency).
(67) a. The glass is almost opaque, but not quite. It’s still transparent.
b. The glass is almost transparent, but not quite. It’s still opaque.
Likewise, (67b) can be used to describe the reverse situation: one in which I
have dialed down almost to 0% of tint. Here transparent has a maximum
standard (complete transparency) and opaque has a minimum standard (partial
opacity). (Kennedy 2007: 37)
And:
(14) [F]or any closed scale adjective, a maximum standard interpretation entails
a minimum one, but not vice-versa. Assuming that stronger meanings are in
general favored […], this preference follows. If minimum standard
interpretations were impossible, however, then the second sentences in
(67a,b) would be contradictory. (Kennedy 2007: 37–38).
What we wish to point out is that once we have an ‘at all’ threshold—where
everything under the threshold is not at all close to the maximum, then we have in
effect a closed scaled with the maximum at one end and the ‘at all’ boundary at the
lower end. And if Kennedy is right, there is the prospect that ‘confident’ may
oscillate somewhat between the maximal and minimal interpretations.16 This point
generalizes. Insofar as ‘justified at all’ and ‘completely justified’ are associated with
a closed scale, there is the prospect that ‘justified’ may oscillate somewhat between
maximal and minimal interpretation. We leave further exploration of this issue to
another occasion.
5 Scale-primacy and scale-derivativeness
For some expressions, it is plausible that some grasp of a scale is integral to
understanding them. For example, it is plausible that an understanding of ‘heavy’
and ‘tall’ requires some grasp of the scales of weight and height respectively. But it
is important to realize that even when scales are completely irrelevant to the
understanding of a predicate, comparative uses of the predicate can be introduced in
a derivative way. Consider, for example, ‘is a feast’. It is easy enough to get the
hang of such constructions as ‘That meal was more of a feast than that one’. One
particularly natural way to understand such claims is as tantamount to ‘That meal
was closer to being a feast to that one’ where there is a rough and ready grasp of
16 For more on the dual life of ‘confident’ see Logins 2019. For an exploration of another epistemically
significant gradable adjective that seems to exhibit a maximal only interpretation, namely ‘supported’, see
Logins 2020.
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some scale of closeness. Of course, grasp of a closeness scale of this sort is hardly
integral to one’s grasp of ‘is a feast’. Nevertheless, having mastered that predicate
one might, often on the fly, contrive some sense of comparative closeness to being a
feast. Consider similarly ‘circular’. It is not plausible that mastering a circularity
scale is integral to understanding ‘being circular’. But having mastered ‘circular’ it
is not hard to contrive a rough and ready scale of being close to being circular. The
scales thus constructed will typically reflect some rough and ready sense of how
close things are to the phenomenon in question. Our ability to do this is quite
general. The claims ‘That is more of an omelet than that’ and ‘She is more
blameless than him’ are perfectly interpretable—each reflects the speaker’s rough
and ready sense of comparative closeness to being an omelet and being blameless
respectively.
Our general ability to introduce comparative structures along these lines should
allay any suspicion that talk of degrees of justification is nonsense. Consider
Jonathan Sutton (who thinks that a belief is justified if and only if it is known):
(15) For me, the notion of a belief being more justified than another justified
belief is, strictly speaking, nonsense—knowledge does not come in degrees.
(Sutton 2007: 154, n4.)
This seems excessive.17 We have a general ability to contrive rough and ready
scales of closeness to any given phenomenon and to use graded adjectives to express
that scale.18
The charge of nonsense is thus unlikely to prove well founded. But some
interesting questions remain. A better question than whether graded uses of
‘justified’ express sense or nonsense is the question whether such uses are derivative
in the way ‘being more of a feast’ is. On one picture, the non-graded notion of
‘justified’ is primary and the graded use highly derivative. On this picture the basic
semantics of ‘justified’ does not associate it with a scale but we can nevertheless
‘‘coerce’’ a scalar use out of it by using general linguistic mechanisms that allow us
to generate a scalar use out of expressions that do not get associated with a scale via
our foundational understanding of them. On a second picture, some kind of scale is
integral to understanding ‘justified’. Call the latter view a ‘scale-fundamental’ view
of ‘justified’ and the former a ‘scale-derivative’ view. Which view is correct? A
second question is also worth addressing: Is there anything of potential significance
to philosophers that may be at stake here? We address each question in turn.
We don’t propose to offer a definitive verdict on whether ‘justified’ is scale-
derivative or not. But we would like to present two interesting lines of thought that
militate in the direction of scale-derivativeness.
17 Unless, that is, we understand ‘strictly speaking nonsense’ to merely entail that the original semantic
denotation of ‘justified’ didn’t already bring a scale with it. Notice though that this is completely
compatible with the claim that sentences of the form ‘That belief is more justified than this’ express a
proposition, are truth evaluable and so on. Relevant here is our discussion of Burnett below.
18 Of course, scales will in some cases be more salient than others. It is often quite easy to rank things for
how circular they are. But the ability to rank meals for closeness to a feast may be rather more messy as
there may be less of a reasonable expectation of a shared sensibility as regards closeness ranking.
Graded epistemic justification
123
One line of thought worth drawing attention to is presented in Burnett’s (2017)
comprehensive treatment of gradable expressions. There she focusses on what she
calls a ‘paradox of absolute adjectives’ (Burnett 2017: 70). The paradox can be
usefully represented as an apparently inconsistent triad: (1) Absolute adjectives are
gradable. (2) Gradability is derived from context-dependent sensitivity to compar-
ison classes. But (3) The semantic denotation of absolute adjectives has nothing to
do with comparison classes.
Burnett in effect says the triad is not inconsistent. The semantic denotation of
absolute adjectives does not have gradability associated with their denotations.
Nevertheless, we can ‘‘stretch’’ the meaning of the relevant adjectives in order to
coerce a gradable use out of them:
(16) I will show that, through giving an appropriate tolerant and strict semantics
for AAs [i.e. absolute adjectives], we can arrive at an understanding of how
it is possible to ‘‘stretch’’ the meaning of an absolute term to... take in the
gradable gamut of reality. (Burnett 2017: 72).
In short, (3) is correct, but that does not deprive absolute adjectives of a gradable
use, since it is the coerced/stretched meaning that is responsible for such a use. (2)
can be preserved alongside (1) by insisting that the stretched meaning involves
sensitivity to comparison classes and that it is this stretched meaning that accounts
for (1).
This is not the place to rehearse Burnett’s admirably detailed case for her picture
of absolute adjectives. What bears emphasis in this context is that her treatment
entails that all absolute adjectives are scale-derivative. Within her framework, the
fact that ‘justified’ is absolute is a decisive reason for classifying it as scale-
derivative.19
Here is a second prima facie reason for thinking that ‘justified’ is scale-
derivative. It is tempting to think that ‘justified’ has a strong affinity with such
normative concepts as that of permissibility and blamelessness. This is a theme of
work in progress by one of us (NN). It is also a theme of some interesting literature
on justification. For example, Beddor (2017), distinguishes strong necessity modals
like ‘must’ from weak necessity modals like ‘ought’, arguing that ‘justification’
functions as the dual of a weak necessity modal, where the semantic value of that
dual is appropriately glossed as faultlessness.20 Here is not the place to defend views
of this kind. But it is worth pointing out that if they are right, that may help the case
in favor of the scale-derivative view. After all graded uses of ‘faultlessness’—‘‘That
was more faultless than that’—or of ‘permissibility’—‘That was more permissible
19 Note that the scale-fundamental adjectives that we earlier offered as paradigmatic—‘tall’ and
‘heavy’—are not absolutes.
20 He suggests further that the permissibility gloss isn’t quite right, since that would wrongly treat the
property of being justified as the dual of a strong necessity modal. Note that the argument of the present
paragraph would be weakened if, owing to the polysemy of ‘justified’, only some uses of ‘justified’
involved a systematic connection with faultlessness. After all, as a referee pointed out, different meanings
associated with a single polysemous expression might recruit different tools.
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than that’—seem to be fairly paradigmatic cases of coerced, scale-derivative, uses
of adjectives.21
So much for our first question. What of our second? Is there anything of
philosophical interest at stake when it comes to scale-fundamentality or scale
derivativeness? Here we wish to make two observations.
First, in cases of adjectives for which graded uses are scale-derivative, we should
be sceptical of any kind of conceptual analysis of that adjective (or the concept
associated with it) that appeals to a scale, at least insofar as the project of conceptual
analysis is supposed to make vivid what our basic understanding of the adjective
consists in. After all, if the adjective is scale-derivative, then associations with a
scale would appear to be a secondary, coerced phenomenon, and peripheral to the
basic understanding of a term. This raises an additional prima facie concern (to the
one raised earlier) about such analyses in the literature as Olson’s gloss on Bonjour
(cited earlier), at least insofar as such claims are offered in anything like the spirit of
a conceptual analysis.22
(9) A belief system is justified if it is coherent to a sufficiently high degree.[…]
(Olsson 2017).
Our second observation is that in many cases, scale-derivativeness brings with it
a significant variability in the scale associated with graded comparative adjectives,
and there may be good reason to expect such variability in the case of the graded use
of ‘justified action’ and ‘justified belief’. Let us elaborate. When it comes to
coerced, scale-derivative uses, there will be no guidance concerning which scale to
deploy that emanates directly from the initial semantical denotation, since that
semantical denotation does not encode a scale. In some cases, however, there will be
a salient, natural way to construct a scale on the fly. When this is the case, we might
expect quite a bit of constancy in the way a scale is generated from context to
context. But when this is not the case, we should expect quite a bit of unruliness in
the behavior of graded uses from conversation to conversation. Let us begin with an
illustration of the former, more disciplined, pattern. Suppose we think of permissible
credences in a proposition P as forming a subrange of the standard credence scale.
Perhaps, for some P, it is the range 0.2–0.3. Then there is an overwhelmingly natural
way of associating a scale with ‘credence x is more permissible than credence y’:
21 We say ‘help the case’ but we should demur from anything stronger than this. After all, as a referee
pointed out, it is not inconceivable that two expressions are equivalent but nevertheless recruit different
technologies (so that one is scale-derivative and the other not).
22 Interestingly, this also raises questions about an approach to (arguably related) normative concepts like
that of permissibility that has been made standard by work of Kratzer (1977, 1991). On that approach
permissibility typically understood in terms of quantification over a relevant domain of situations (a
modal base) that gets a ranking (via an ‘‘ordering source’’). Insofar as the ordering source is supposed to
represent the underlying semantic workings of ‘ought’ and ‘may’, we may worry that this improperly
treats certain graded talk as scale-fundamental when in fact it is scale-derivative. For a critique of the
ordering source approach to ‘Ought’, see Finlay (2016). An aspect of Beddor (2017) that we are less
comfortable with is its central reliance on a ranking of situations by a norm. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to pursue this issue further.
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we treat the credences in the permissible range as completely permissible and then
rank individual credences outside the range as more or less permissible according to
how close they are to the range. Because of the naturalness of this way of doing
things it would take a fair bit of effort to imagine a context where we say ‘The
credences that are completely permissible are 0.2–0.3 but the credence 0.4 is more
permissible than 0.32’.
The credence case is relatively special, however. For many coerced uses there is
no particularly salient natural scale to turn to when contriving a scale, and
whichever scale is constructed on the fly will be highly sensitive to the goals and
background of the conversation in which the coerced use is in play. Consider for
example ‘x is more of a feast than y’. There are various parameters that might be
brought into play: The variety of food involved, the quantity of food involved, the
fanciness of the food involved, or some vague weighting of some or all of these
factors. By contrast with ‘permissible credence’ we would expect significant
variability in the coerced scales.
What of ‘justified’ as applied to either actions or beliefs? Here again, analogies
with permission and or faultlessness may be instructive. Is there a salient natural
way of ranking actions that are not faultless as more or less faultless (or of ranking
actions that are not permissible as more or less permissible)? As far as we can tell,
the situation seems rather more like that of a feast than that of permissible credence.
One might contrive a rough and ready way of counting faults, and then rank actions
as more or less faultless dependent on the number of faults. Or one might contrive a
rough and ready way of weighing seriousness of faults and count actions as more or
less faultless dependent on the ‘‘seriousness’’ scale. Or one might contrive a rough
and ready way of ranking how aware people were of the fact that were at fault and
use that. But there doesn’t seem to be a very salient and natural scale to gravitate
to.23 And as far as we can see, while there may be a salient scale for permissible
credence, the situation for permissible and/or faultless belief seems to be rather like
that of permissible and or faultless action. Among beliefs that are at fault,
epistemically speaking, how do we rank them for being more or less faultless? It
would, after all, be a bit naı̈ve to think that we can grade on a scale of ‘‘probability
on the evidence’’. After all, it is a familiar point that beliefs well supported by the
evidence may nevertheless be formed by imperfect means. Furthermore, we have
seen that graded uses of ‘justified belief’ do not play with numericals in the way one
might expect if it were associated with a probability scale. Moreover, those of us
23 Clearly, ranking things as more or less along a scale need not bring with it congruence verdicts that
permit judgments along such lines as ‘The distance between x and y is the distance between y and z’. And
without congruence verdicts, there will be no sound basis for such claims as ‘That is three times more F
than that one’. Neta (2015) doubts whether departures from rational permissibility can be measured. He
writes: ‘‘To say that some cognitive options depart more or less from rational permissibility than others is
not to imply that departures from rationally permissibility can be measured, any more than saying that
some people are more scrupulous than others implies that scrupulousness can be measured. Comparisons
of more or less can be truthfully made, even when such comparisons cannot be measured. (The
comparative relation could, for instance, generate only a partial ordering among relata.)’’ (Neta 2015:
288). We think that the best way of precisifying this thought is in terms of an absence of congruence
structure.
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who are happy to think that a belief can be knowledge without being based on
evidence might think that an evidentially unsupported belief that is not knowledge
might nevertheless in some sense count as being close to being justified simpliciter
on account of there being a nearby situation where the same method produces
knowledge. Our suspicion, then, is that there may not be any natural scale to turn to
when generating a coerced meaning for ‘That belief is more justified than that’. And
if that is right, we should place graded uses of ‘justified’ in the ‘highly variable’
category.
If graded uses of ‘justified’ are both scale-derivative and rather unruly, this can
serve as a partial vindication of what has gone on in epistemology. Epistemologists
have for the most part tended to say a lot about what it takes for a belief to be
justified and have said very little about graded justification. If the graded uses are
scale-derivative then it is best to ignore graded uses when providing an account of
justification simpliciter.24 And if the graded uses are unruly, displaying significant
variation in content from conversation to conversation, then there may be little
gained by tackling a general question of the form ‘What is it for a belief to be more
justified than another?’ Perhaps epistemologists can proceed as they were without
undue concern.
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